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I. Introduction 
 This article examines how the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT 
Act”) has been interpreted and applied by federal agencies to collect electronic data in the United 
States for the purpose of combating terrorism.  In addition, it reviews whether the federal 
agencies’ programs are legally valid under the USA PATRIOT Act and the Fourth Amendment. 
Part II provides the constitutional framework that establishes and limits the authority of 
federal agencies to conduct surveillance operations domestically. This includes an overview of 
the Fourth Amendment and the related case law governing surveillance.  Part III provides the 
statutory framework that examines the relevant statutes, in addition to the USA PATRIOT Act, 
that pertain to intelligence collection and surveillance law, such as the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III”) and the Stored Communications Act of 1986 (“SCA”).   
Part IV reviews the recently exposed government surveillance programs that have been 
collecting information on U.S. citizens at home.  This section focuses on the two primary federal 
agencies that have used the USA PATRIOT Act to conduct domestic surveillance – the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the National Security Agency (“NSA”).  In addition, the 
section evaluates the constitutionality of these programs and explains why they are not in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.  It also explains how the programs are legally valid when 
considering the interest of maintaining national security. 
 
 
II. Constitutional Framework 
 The United States Supreme Court has examined the topic of surveillance in relation to the 
Fourth Amendment in numerous cases.  These cases shed light into whether the current 
surveillance programs by the FBI and NSA are constitutional.  However, an initial examination 
of the Fourth Amendment is necessary to fully understanding the case law.  The Fourth 
Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.
1
 
 
Thus, the Fourth Amendment can be broken down into two sections: the first portion as 
“Reasonableness Clause” and the second portion as the “Warrant Clause.”  While the 
“Reasonableness Clause” establishes the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures 
by the government, the “Warrant Clause” provides the requirements for a warrant to be issued. 
The matter of surveillance was first reviewed by the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. 
United States.
2
  There, law enforcement officers intercepted communications by inserting wires 
along the original telephone cables that were outside the properties of the defendants.
3
  The 
Court held that the wiretapping of the defendants’ telephone conversations did not constitute a 
                                                 
1
 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
2
 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
3
 Id. at 456-7. 
“search” or “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and thus, no Fourth 
Amendment protection applied.
4
 
In 1967, the Supreme Court reviewed two cases relating to wiretapping and 
eavesdropping surveillance: Berger v. New York and Katz v. United States.  In Berger v. New 
York, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to bribe a public official based primarily on 
evidence gathered by eavesdropping.
5
  The Supreme Court found that the New York statute 
granting the authority to eavesdrop was too broad in scope and thus, violated the Fourth 
Amendment.
6
  The Court further held that because phone conversations were within the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment, the use of electronic devices to capture such conversations 
constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Amendment.7 
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court again addressed the collection of evidence 
obtained by surveillance of telephone conversations.
8
  There, FBI agents heard the defendant’s 
telephone conversations through an electronic listening and recording device that was placed on 
the outside of the public telephone booth used by the defendant.
9
  The Court specifically 
overruled Olmstead and found that because the defendant expected his conversations to remain 
private despite being in a public telephone booth, the government surveillance constituted a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and thus, provided the defendant with 
protection in the form of a warrant needing to be secured prior to the wiretapping surveillance.
10
 
Prior to the Katz decision, the Court utilized a property-rights test that required a trespass 
or physical intrusion into a “constitutionally protected area” in order for the Fourth Amendment 
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7
 Id. at 62-4. 
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 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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 Id. at 348. 
10
 Id. at 352-9. 
to apply.
11
  Katz, however, established not only the warrant requirement for wiretapping, but also 
replaced the property-based approach with a two-prong framework for determining what 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
12
  The first prong asks whether the individual 
in question demonstrates an actual expectation of privacy; in other words, a subjective test.
13
  
The second prong revolves around an objective test of whether that expectation is reasonable in 
the eyes of society.
14
 
The Supreme Court’s next case dealing with electronic surveillance was Smith v. 
Maryland.
15
  There, law enforcement officers requested that the local phone company install a 
device called a pen register
16
 to record the phone numbers dialed from the defendant’s home 
phone.
17
  However, the officers did not obtain a warrant or court order prior to the installation.
18
  
The Supreme Court applied the two prong test established in Katz to find that neither the 
defendant manifested an expectation of privacy nor society could reasonably expect privacy in 
the numbers dialed on a phone.
19
  In essence, by dialing phone numbers that a third-party phone 
company would ultimately receive, the defendant had voluntarily disclosed that information to 
the public and thus, relinquished any anticipated notion of privacy. The Court went on to hold 
that because the installation and use of the pen register did not constitute a search according to 
the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers did not need to obtain a search warrant.
20
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 Joshua Dressler, Alan C. Michaels, Understanding Criminal Procedure Volume 1: Investigation 68-9 (6th ed, 
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 A pen register should be distinguished from a trap and trace device.  While a pen register records phone numbers 
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 Id. at 737. 
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 Id. at 745. 
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 Id. at 745-6. 
 The improvement of technology has required the Supreme Court to reconsider what 
constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  For instance, in Kyllo v. 
United States, law enforcement officials, without a warrant, used a thermal-imaging device at the 
defendant’s home to determine whether there were heat signatures consistent with the growth 
and maintenance of marijuana.
21
  After the device produced sufficient evidence indicating that 
marijuana was in the defendant’s home, a search warrant was obtained and executed.22  The 
Court, however, found that because the thermal imaging device was “not in general public use, to 
explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical 
intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”23 
 Finally, in United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the 
use of a Global Positioning System (“GPS”) device to track the defendant’s movements 
constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.24  Although a warrant was 
obtained by law enforcement officials, the GPS monitoring exceeded the scope of the warrant.
25
  
The Court held that law enforcement’s use of the GPS did amount to a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and as such, invalidated any evidence obtained outside the 
scope of the warrant.
26
 
In reviewing these cases, the decisions indicate a trend by the Supreme Court that despite 
advancements in technology, privacy expectations under the Fourth Amendment exist to protect 
U.S. citizens against warrantless searches and seizures.  For instance, while Katz shows how 
privacy expectations can be found in a public telephone booth – a form of communications 
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technology rarely used today due to the dawn of mobile phones – the Kyllo decision 
demonstrates how law enforcement’s use of modern technology in the form of a thermal imaging 
device demands protection under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
III. Statutory Framework 
A. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
 As a result of the Supreme Court decisions in Berger and Katz, Congress enacted Title III 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III”).27  In general, the statute 
requires the government to secure a warrant or another form of judicial approval in order to 
conduct electronic surveillance for criminal investigation purposes.
28
  Applications for court 
orders approving the wiretap or electronic surveillance must show probable cause that the 
surveillance will produce evidence of a crime.
29
  Title III establishes criminal penalties and civil 
damages against any individual who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures 
any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept” any of the covered communications.30  
The statute defines “intercept” to mean “the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any 
wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other 
device.”31  Although the original version of Title III covered only wire and oral communications, 
Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”) as an 
amendment to Title III to include electronic communications.
32
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 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211. 
28
 18 U.S.C. § 2516. 
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 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(d). 
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 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). 
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 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). 
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 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848. 
Title III does grant certain exceptions, however, such as a provider exception and 
“readily accessible to the public” exception.33  It is noteworthy to mention that the provider 
exception allows for providers to assist government agencies in the interception of wire, oral, or 
electronic communications or electronic surveillance operations with a court order or Executive 
Branch certification.
34
  In essence, Title III forbids either private party or governmental entity 
from the interception of wire, oral, and electronic communication unless one of the exceptions 
applies. 
B. Stored Communication Act of 1986 
 In 1986, Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) as part of the 
ECPA.
35
  The primary purpose of the SCA was to provide Internet network account users 
statutory privacy rights due to the limited protection offered by the Fourth Amendment.
36
  In 
essence, the statute enhances protection against not only government requests to access users’ 
private information from Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), but also voluntary disclosure by 
ISPs to the government about their customers.
37
  Section 2701 of the SCA establishes criminal 
penalties for any individual who: 
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an 
electronic communication service is provided; or 
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby 
obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic 
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be 
punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
38
 
 
C. Road to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
                                                 
33
 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). 
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In enacting Title III, Congress did not tackle the issue of warrantless surveillance in the 
United States for foreign intelligence collection purposes.  However, since the mid twentieth 
century, presidents beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt have used their Executive authority to 
authorize warrantless electronic surveillance.  The Supreme Court directly addressed the matter 
in United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (“Keith”).39  
The case involved a conspiracy by a domestic group to bomb an office of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (“CIA”) in Michigan.40  There, the Court held that under the Fourth Amendment, the 
government must secure a warrant or another form of judicial authorization before conducting 
electronic surveillance for the purpose of combating a domestic threat.
41
  The Court, however, 
limited its finding by stating that because of the “potential distinctions between Title III criminal 
surveillances and those involving the domestic security…the warrant application may vary 
according to the governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving 
protection.”42  The Court noted: 
that domestic security surveillance may involve different policy and practical 
considerations from the surveillance of “ordinary crime.” The gathering of 
security intelligence is often long range and involves the interrelation of various 
sources and types of information. The exact targets of such surveillance may be 
more difficult to identify than in surveillance operations against many types of 
crime specified in Title III. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence 
gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the 
Government's preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency. Thus, 
the focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against 
more conventional types of crime 
 
. . . . Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they 
are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for 
intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. For the warrant 
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 United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
The case is also known as the Keith case because of U.S. District Court Judge Damon Keith’s decision, rejecting the 
government’s argument that a search warrant was not required to conduct surveillance for issues pertaining to 
“domestic security.” 
40
 Id. at 299. 
41
 Id. at 321. 
42
 Id. at 322-3. 
application may vary according to the governmental interest to be enforced and 
the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.
43
 
 
Thus, the Court recognized a critical distinction of Fourth Amendment requirements between 
domestic surveillance operations for national security and criminal investigations. 
After the Court’s decision, another case involving warrantless electronic surveillance for 
national security reasons arose in the D.C. Circuit.  In Zweibon v. Mitchell, federal law 
enforcement officers, with the approval of the Attorney General, conducted a warrantless 
electronic surveillance operation of the Jewish Defense League (JDL).
44
  The JDL was a political 
group located in the United States that the government argued was committing acts of aggression 
that threatened U.S.-Soviet relations and thus resulted in the Soviet Union, a foreign power, 
posing a national security threat to the United States.
45
  The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, 
disagreed with the government’s argument, and held that despite the surveillance having been 
approved by the executive branch in the name of national security and foreign intelligence 
collection, the Fourth Amendment required that a warrant be obtained.
46
 
The Watergate scandal exposed gross abuses by the Nixon Administration to conduct 
warrantless surveillance operations on various opposition political groups and individuals in the 
name of national security, but in reality, to further the Administration’s own goals and agendas.   
For instance, some of the government’s surveillance activities included gathering information on 
civil rights leader and activist Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Women’s Liberation Movement.47  
In essence, this resulted in collection of “enormous amounts of personal and political information 
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 Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 605-6 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
45
 Id. at 608-9. 
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 Id. at 614. 
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 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights of 
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serving no legitimate governmental interest.”48  As a result, a U.S. Senate committee, headed by 
Senator Frank Church, was formed in 1975 to investigate the activities of U.S. intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies.  The investigation uncovered domestic intelligence collection efforts 
that critics argued violated the Fourth Amendment.
49
 
D. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
In response to Watergate and the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Zweibon, Congress enacted 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) in 1978 to establish oversight of domestic 
surveillance activities by intelligence and law enforcement agencies that are conducted for 
foreign intelligence purposes.
50
  FISA provides that federal law enforcement agencies must 
obtain some form of judicial authorization to conduct electronic surveillance or physical searches 
of individuals or groups engaged in international terrorism against the United States on behalf of 
a foreign power.
51
  The statute establishes criminal penalties and civil liabilities for any 
individual who intentionally engages in electronic surveillance not authorized by the statute.
52
  
Although FISA contains provisions related to physical searches, our primary focus will be on 
electronic surveillance.
53
 
Court-ordered electronic surveillance requests are granted by a special court created by 
FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”).54  FISC oversees application 
requests made by federal law enforcement agencies for surveillance orders.
55
  The FISC meets in 
                                                 
48
 Id. at 261. 
49
 See S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 9 (1978) (stating that the “report of the Senate Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, issued in 1976, provided firm evidence that 
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50
 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783. 
51
 50 U.S.C. § 1804 and 50 U.S.C. § 1802. 
52
 50 U.S.C. § 1809 and 50 U.S.C. § 1810. 
53
 50 U.S.C. § 1821 to § 1829. 
54
 50 U.S.C. § 1803. 
55
 Id. 
secret and is comprised of eleven United States District Court judges that are selected by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
56
  Although arguments have been made challenging the 
constitutionality of FISA, courts have generally disagreed and upheld FISA’s constitutionality.57 
For FISC to grant a court order permitting surveillance, the federal law enforcement 
officer applying for surveillance order must initially obtain the Attorney General’s approval and 
then submit an application to FISC containing the following: 
(1) the identity of the Federal officer making the application; 
(2) the authority conferred on the Attorney General by the President of the United States 
and the approval of the Attorney General to make the application; 
(3) the identity, if known, or a description of the target of the electronic surveillance; 
(4) a statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify his 
belief that— 
(A) the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power; and 
(B) each of the facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed 
is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power; 
(5) a statement of the proposed minimization procedures; 
(6) a detailed description of the nature of the information sought and the type of 
communications or activities to be subjected to the surveillance; 
(7) a certification or certifications by the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs or an executive branch official or officials designated by the President from 
among those executive officers employed in the area of national security or defense and  
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the  
Senate— 
(A) that the certifying official deems the information  
sought to be foreign intelligence information;  
(B) that the purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign  
intelligence information;  
(C) that such information cannot reasonably be obtained  
by normal investigative techniques;  
(D) that designates the type of foreign intelligence  
information being sought according to the categories  
described in section 101 (e); and  
(E) including a statement of the basis for the certification  
                                                 
56
 The number of judges on FISC was increased from seven to eleven after the enactment of the USA PATRIOT 
Act. 
57
 See United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that special courts such as the FISA 
Court do not violate Article III of the Constitution); United States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538, 550 (E.D. Va. 
2006) (holding that FISC did not violate First Amendment rights of defendants for their lobbying activities). 
that—  
(i) the information sought is the type of foreign  
intelligence information designated; and  
(ii) such information cannot reasonably be obtained  
by normal investigative techniques…58 
 
An initial application for electronic surveillance under FISA contains several significant 
requirements that demand emphasis.  They include the requirement of executive branch approval 
from the Attorney General; minimization procedures that must comply with the definition 
established in the statute; and the executive branch official’s certification that the surveillance is 
being conducted for a foreign intelligence information purpose.  Minimization procedures under 
FISA are defined as: 
(1) specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are 
reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular 
surveillance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the 
dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting 
United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, 
produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information; 
(2) procedures that require that nonpublicly available information, which is not 
foreign intelligence information, as defined in subsection (e)(1) of this section, 
shall not be disseminated in a manner that identifies any United States person, 
without such person’s consent, unless such person’s identity is necessary to 
understand foreign intelligence information or assess its importance; 
(3) notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), procedures that allow for the retention 
and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime which has been, is 
being, or is about to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for 
law enforcement purposes; and 
(4) notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), with respect to any electronic 
surveillance approved pursuant to section 1802 (a) of this title, procedures that 
require that no contents of any communication to which a United States person is 
a party shall be disclosed, disseminated, or used for any purpose or retained for 
longer than 72 hours unless a court order under section 1805 of this title is 
obtained or unless the Attorney General determines that the information indicates 
a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.
59
 
 
                                                 
58
 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 104(a)(7), 92 Stat. 1783. 
59
 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h). 
In addition, FISC must determine that probable cause
60
 exists as to the target of the 
surveillance being a “foreign power” or an “agent of foreign power” and the location of the 
surveillance being used by that foreign power or its agent.
61
  In the event that the target is a 
“United States person,” FISC must evaluate whether the individual is being “considered a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the 
first amendment to the Constitution of the United States” as part of the probable cause 
determination.
62
  Because FISC’s probable cause determination revolves around distinguishing 
whether a “United States person” can be an “agent of foreign power,” FISA’s definition is of 
utmost importance.  FISA defines a “United States person” who is considered an “agent of 
foreign power” as any person who: 
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on 
behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of 
the criminal statutes of the United States; 
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign 
power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or 
on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a 
violation of the criminal statutes of the United States; 
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are 
in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power; 
(D) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in 
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage 
in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
63
 
 
FISA also establishes that the purpose of the surveillance order must be for  
foreign intelligence.  The statute defines foreign intelligence information to mean: 
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to, 
the ability of the United States to protect against— 
                                                 
60
 Probable cause in the context of domestic intelligence collection differs from probable cause in the criminal 
investigation context.  For instance, while probable cause in criminal investigation centers on whether the crime has 
been or will be committed, probable cause in domestic intelligence collection depends on whether the target and 
location of the surveillance is a foreign power or agent of foreign power and that the foreign power or agent will use 
the targeted surveillance location. 
61
 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A) and (B). 
62
 Id. 
63
 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i). 
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power; 
(B) sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or 
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a 
foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or 
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to, and if 
concerning a United States person is necessary to— 
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or 
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
64
 
 
Since the Supreme Court in Katz found that electronic surveillance constitutes a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the lower courts have wrestled with the issue of 
whether warrantless electronic surveillance could ever be conducted.  In the landmark case of 
United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, the FBI conducted a warrantless surveillance operation on 
one of the defendants, Truong Dinh Hung, who was a Vietnamese citizen suspected of 
committing espionage by transmitting classified information to the Vietnam government.
65
  
There, the Fourth Circuit established a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement and held that warrants should not need to be obtained for every foreign 
intelligence surveillance operation.
66
 
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit underscored that the “executive should be excused from 
securing a warrant only when the surveillance is conducted ‘primarily’ for foreign intelligence 
reasons.”67  In applying the “primary purpose” test, the court affirmed the district court’s 
conclusion that because the investigation of Truong had become more of a criminal investigation 
than one with a foreign intelligence purpose as of July 20, 1977, evidence collected after that 
                                                 
64
 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e). 
65
 United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 911-912 (4th Cir. 1980). 
66
 Id. at 914-5. 
67
 Id. at 915. 
date should be excluded due to the lack of a warrant.
68
  Thus, the court distinguished warrantless 
surveillance for criminal investigation from that of foreign intelligence collection. 
Because the case was decided immediately after the enactment of FISA, the Fourth 
Circuit did not have an opportunity to undergo its analysis under the statute.  Nonetheless, 
Truong is significant for two main reasons.  First, Truong recognized the inherent power of the 
Executive to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence gathering 
purposes.
69
  Second, the primary purpose test established a bright line rule for federal 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies to follow when conducting warrantless electronic 
surveillance.
70
 
In addition to reviewing the constitutionality of warrantless electronic surveillance, courts 
have examined domestic intelligence collection with a court order under FISA in relation to an 
individual’s privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment.71  In United States v. Duggan, the 
Second Circuit not only held that FISA was constitutional, but also underscored the Supreme 
Court’s decision in the Keith case that Fourth Amendment requirements are fluid when 
“differing governmental interests are at stake.”72  There, the defendants, who were members of 
the Irish Republican Army, argued that the government’s surveillance leaned more towards 
criminal investigation purposes than national security reasons.
73
  The court, however, applied the 
primary purpose test established in Truong to determine that the surveillance application met 
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“the statutory requirement for certifying that the information sought was foreign intelligence 
information.”74 
E. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 
The tragic events of September 11 prompted Congress, under the direction of the Bush 
Administration, to take a more aggressive posture against terrorism by amending FISA with the 
USA PATRIOT Act.
75
  In effect, the USA PATRIOT Act provides federal agencies with more 
powerful tools to combat terrorism ranging from stronger anti-money laundering measures to 
enhanced border security and surveillance procedures.  For instance, the “Enhanced Surveillance 
Procedures” section of the USA PATRIOT Act contains modifications to FISA that allow 
surveillance activities that the original statute did not permit.
76
  Several of these provisions 
include: (1) the expanded access to records and other tangible things; (2) the enhanced use of pen 
register and trap and trace devices; (3) roving surveillance; and (4) the lone wolf amendment.
77
  
These provisions will be examined in turn to show how federal agencies can apply the statutory 
enhancements to their surveillance programs. 
Section 215 under the USA PATRIOT Act dispenses with the limitation in Section 501
78
 
under FISA regarding the seizure of business records from a “common carrier, public 
accommodation facility, physical storage facility, or vehicle rental facility.”79  Not only does 
Section 215 now allow the FBI to obtain business records from any business or entity, but it also 
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grants the agency authority to seize more than just business records by modifying the language to 
“any tangible things,” which includes “books, records, papers, documents, and other items.”80   
Additionally, Section 215 relaxes the application requirements for a court order.  
Originally, the application had to contain “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe 
that the person to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.” 81 
However, an application for a court order under Section 215 requires only “a statement of facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant 
to an authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment) conducted in accordance with 
subsection (a)(2) to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person 
or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities...”82  Thus, by 
granting the FBI enhanced authority to collect items, Section 215 plays a crucial role in the 
intelligence collection programs conducted by the federal agencies. 
Section 214 under the USA PATRIOT Act also eases the application requirements for a 
court order to use pen register and trap and trace devices.
83
  Essentially, Section 214 follows a 
similar certification process as the business records application for a court order under Section 
215 and thus allows for more flexible use of the pen register and trap and trace devices by federal 
agencies.
84
 
Section 206 allows for roving surveillance
85
 and dispenses with the previous requirement 
of having to identify the target of surveillance when obtaining a court order.
86
  Lastly, Section 
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The FBI and intelligence gathering communities find these necessary because terrorists have the ability to change 
6001 or the “lone wolf” provision modifies the definition of “agent of foreign power” to include 
any non-U.S. person who “engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation 
therefore.”87  This allows for surveillance of individuals who have no affiliation to a foreign 
power or entity, but still engage or prepare to engage in international terrorism. 
Another main adjustment of the USA PATRIOT Act to FISA was changing the language 
to allow for electronic surveillance without collecting foreign intelligence as the primary purpose 
of the surveillance.  In essence, the USA PATRIOT Act sought to replace the more restrictive 
primary purpose test with a more liberal test that would allow for surveillance to be obtained 
more easily.  The Act did so by amending FISA’s certification requirement so that only “a 
significant purpose” rather than “a purpose” of the surveillance be related to collecting foreign 
intelligence.
88
  This modification to FISA resulted in expanding the government’s ability to more 
easily obtain a surveillance order from FISC because the government did not need to 
demonstrate that foreign intelligence information collection was the “primary purpose” of the 
application.  With the threshold lowered, the government could submit a surveillance application 
for other reasons so long as foreign intelligence information was a “significant purpose.” 
This modification was challenged in In re Sealed Case No. 02-001.
89
  There, the 
government appealed a decision by the FISC which despite approving the government’s 
application for surveillance, the court imposed certain restrictions in its order.
90
   These 
restrictions were: 
                                                                                                                                                             
computers, email accounts, or cellular telephones quickly upon reading an order and learning that the government 
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law enforcement officials shall not make recommendations to intelligence 
officials concerning the initiation, operation, continuation or expansion of FISA 
searches or surveillances. Additionally, the FBI and the Criminal Division [of the 
Department of Justice] shall ensure that law enforcement officials do not direct or 
control the use of the FISA procedures to enhance criminal prosecution, and that 
advice intended to preserve the option of a criminal prosecution does not 
inadvertently result in the Criminal Division's directing or controlling the 
investigation using FISA searches and surveillances toward law enforcement 
objectives.
91
 
 
The FISC’s concern revolved around their belief that FISA erected a barrier or “wall” 
between the intelligence and law enforcement realms
92, which required the court to “approve 
applications for electronic surveillance only if the government's objective is not primarily 
directed toward criminal prosecution of the foreign agents for their foreign intelligence 
activity.”93  The FISC court of review, however, dismissed this concern by recognizing that 
because counterintelligence involves both intelligence collection and law enforcement tactics, a 
barrier or “wall” separating the two could prove harmful to intelligence collection as a whole and 
the ultimate goal of protecting against terrorist attacks.
94
 
In addition, the FISC court of review rejected the “primary purpose” test established in 
Truong and applied by courts in subsequent cases.
95
  The court reviewed the legislative history of 
the USA PATRIOT Act and found that “there is simply no question … that Congress was keenly 
aware that this amendment relaxed a requirement that the government show that its primary 
purpose was other than criminal prosecution.”96  The court went on to hold that “accordingly, the 
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Patriot Act amendments clearly disapprove the primary purpose test. And as a matter of 
straightforward logic, if a FISA application can be granted even if ‘foreign intelligence’ is only a 
significant - not a primary - purpose, another purpose can be primary. One other legitimate 
purpose that could exist is to prosecute a target for a foreign intelligence crime.”97  Thus, the 
court found that under the PATRIOT Act, an application for a surveillance order to FISC does 
not need to show that the primary purpose is not for criminal prosecution.
98
 
Lastly, the court reviewed whether the application requirements for obtaining a 
surveillance order from FISC complied with the Fourth Amendment.
99
  The court initially drew a 
comparison between FISA’s procedures with Title III in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of 
FISA.
100
  For instance, the court found that “in many significant respects the two statutes are 
equivalent” despite some differences in protection.101  In addition, the court underscored the 
significant difference between ordinary criminal law and foreign intelligence crimes: 
The main purpose of ordinary criminal law is twofold: to punish the wrongdoer 
and to deter other persons in society from embarking on the same course. The 
government's concern with respect to foreign intelligence crimes, on the other 
hand, is overwhelmingly to stop or frustrate the immediate criminal activity. As 
we discussed in the first section of this opinion, the criminal process is often used 
as part of an integrated effort to counter the malign efforts of a foreign power. 
Punishment of the terrorist or espionage agent is really a secondary objective; 
indeed, punishment of a terrorist is often a moot point.
102
 
 
The court then used this distinction in weighing the government’s interest against individual 
privacy interests and found that “FISA as amended is constitutional because the surveillances it 
authorizes are reasonable.”103 
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IV. Surveillance Programs 
In December 2005, the New York Times revealed the existence of a warrantless 
surveillance program authorized by then President George W. Bush.
104
  The article reported that 
“under a presidential order signed in 2002, the [NSA] intelligence agency has monitored the 
international telephone calls and international e-mail messages of hundreds, perhaps thousands, 
of people inside the United States without warrants over the past three years…”105  The article 
noted that although warrants were still required for conducting surveillance on purely domestic 
calls, “the agency has been conducting some warrantless eavesdropping on people in the United 
States who are linked, even if indirectly, to suspected terrorists through the chain of phone 
numbers and e-mail addresses…”106 
A. Terrorist Surveillance Program 
In response to the New York Times disclosure, then President Bush acknowledged the 
existence of the NSA program
107
 and identified it as the Terrorist Surveillance Program 
(“TSP”).108  The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) responded as well by issuing a legal opinion on 
the program that argued its legitimacy based on the President’s inherent executive authority and 
statutory authorization via the Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”).109  Shortly 
after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress passed the AUMF, which provided the 
President with the authority to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
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organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks…”110  The DOJ thus contended that “Congress in the AUMF gave its express approval to 
the military conflict against al Qaeda and its allies and thereby to the President’s use of all 
traditional and accepted incidents of force in this current military conflict—including warrantless 
electronic surveillance to intercept enemy communications both at home and abroad.”111 
The constitutionality of the NSA program was challenged by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) along with several other plaintiffs in a lawsuit against the agency.  In 
ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, the district court found that the surveillance program violated not 
just the First and Fourth Amendments, but the separation of powers doctrine as well due to the 
lack of judicial authorization in conducting the surveillance as required under FISA.
112
  The 
district court’s decision, however, was vacated for lack of jurisdiction after an appeal by the 
NSA to the Sixth Circuit.
113
 
In January 2007, then Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez announced the Bush 
administration’s plans not to pursue the reauthorization of the TSP.114  In addition, he indicated 
that electronic surveillance under the TSP would be reviewed by FISC.
115
  However, later that 
same year, President Bush signed the Protect America Act of 2007 (“PAA”), which amended key 
provisions of FISA to allow for surveillance similar to TSP to be conducted.
116
  The Act 
eliminated the requirement for a court order when conducting electronic surveillance so long as 
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 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–55, 121 Stat. 552. 
the surveillance targets were “reasonably believed” to be located outside of the United States.117  
Additionally, the statute stripped FISC’s authority in being the judicial arbiter for approving 
government surveillance applications by redirecting that power to the Director of National 
Intelligence (“DNI”) and Attorney General (“AG”).118  Under the PAA, the DNI and AG were 
granted authority to approve surveillance requests from intelligence officers instead of FISC.
119
  
And in those instances when electronic surveillance without court order was authorized, the 
statute required notification to FISC within 72 hours of the authorized surveillance.
120
  In 
essence, the PAA effectively weakened FISC’s authority and removed the court from the process 
it was granted under FISA. 
B. The Road to the Current Surveillance Programs 
Due to a six month sunset provision, the PAA was slated to expire in 2008.
121
  In 2008, 
however, Congress enacted the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (“FAA”), which established a 
new Title VII that contained similar provisions to the PAA.
122
  Specifically, Section 702 under 
Title VII establishes procedures for surveillance of non-U.S. persons and U.S. persons outside of 
the United States.
123
  Like the PAA, Section 702 provides that “the Attorney General and the 
Director of National Intelligence may authorize jointly, for a period of up to 1 year from the 
effective date of the authorization, the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.”124  However, there are 
limitations to that surveillance: 
b) Limitations An acquisition authorized under subsection (a)—  
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(1) may not intentionally target any person known at the time of 
acquisition to be located in the United States; 
(2) may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a 
particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States; 
(3) may not intentionally target a United States person reasonably believed 
to be located outside the United States; 
(4) may not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the 
sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition 
to be located in the United States; and 
(5) shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States.
125
 
 
The certification procedure revolves around two scenarios.  The first involves FISC 
granting a court order approving of a written certification and any supporting affidavit by the AG 
and the DNI.
126
  The second scenario occurs when a court order has not been issued by FISC, but 
there are exigent circumstances which require the AG and DNI to authorize the surveillance of 
non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States.
127
  The AG and DNI are 
then required to submit to FISC “a certification for such authorization as soon as practicable but 
in no event later than 7 days after such determination is made.”128  In addition, surveillance can 
be conducted prior to the submission of the certification.
129
  Thus, the second scenario allows for 
surveillance without court order so long as exigent circumstances exist. 
In response to the FAA’s enactment, a group of attorneys and organizations filed a 
lawsuit against the government in July 2008 challenging the constitutionality of Title VII and 
arguing that the FAA violated the Fourth Amendment.
130
  The plaintiffs contended that since 
their work involved electronically communicating “with colleagues, clients, journalistic sources, 
witnesses, experts, foreign government officials, and victims of human rights abuses located 
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outside the United States,” the FAA undermined their ability to adequately perform their duties 
and represent their clients.
131
  Thus, the plaintiffs argued that the costs they incurred from having 
to protect their communications granted them standing to bring suit.
132
 
The district court, however, disagreed and found that “plaintiffs have not shown that any 
specific action is threatened or contemplated against them because they have not shown that they 
are subject to the FAA.”133  Although the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s 
judgment,
134
 the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately held that the plaintiffs lacked standing and thus, 
did not reach the issue of whether the FAA violated the Fourth Amendment.
135
 
C. Telephony Metadata Surveillance Program 
In December 2012, President Obama extended Title VII of FISA for another five years 
until December 2017.  Under his term, two NSA surveillance programs have been revealed: NSA 
collection of telephony metadata authorized under the auspices of Section 215 and PRISM.  
Regarding the former, London’s Guardian newspaper reported in June 2013 that pursuant to a 
FISC order issued in April 2013 and set to expire in July 2013, the NSA has been collecting 
telephone records of Verizon customers in the United States.
136
  Specifically, the FISC order 
compels Verizon to: 
“produce to the National Security Agency (NSA) upon service of this Order, and 
continue production on an ongoing daily basis thereafter for the duration of this 
Order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, an electronic copy of the following 
tangible things: all call detail records or ‘telephony metadata’ created by Verizon 
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communications (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within 
the United States, including local telephone calls.”137 
 
It is noteworthy to mention that the order applies to the collection of telephony metadata, not 
substantive content.
138
   
The NSA telephony metadata surveillance program appears to be authorized by Section 
215’s business records collection under the USA PATRIOT Act.  Not only did Section 215 
expand the language of business records to include “any tangible things,” but it also relaxed the 
purpose requirement to allow for collection of “any tangible things” when “the records 
concerned are sought for an authorized investigation to obtain foreign intelligence 
information.”139  Thus, it can be argued that a broad reading of Section 215 allows for the NSA 
collection of telephony metadata since Congress approved of the modified language from 
business records to any tangible things, which includes “books, records, papers, documents, and 
other items.”140  Although telephony metadata is not explicitly listed, the inclusion of “other 
items” as part of “any tangible things” is wide enough language that the collection of telephony 
metadata is within the reach of the statute.
141
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In In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the 
Production of Tangible Things, etc., FISC examined the issue of the FBI’s collection of 
telephony metadata under Section 215 and determined not only that the surveillance applications 
complied with the Fourth Amendment, but also that the requests were “lawful and required” 
under the statute.
142
  There, FISC initially underwent a Fourth Amendment analysis and 
established that “the production of telephone service provider metadata is squarely controlled by 
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Maryland.
143
  FISC then underscored the 
importance of the FBI’s surveillance application requesting “daily production of certain 
telephony metadata in bulk belonging to companies without specifying the particular number of 
an individual.”144  FISC found that because there was no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
such information maintained by telephone companies as held by Smith, Fourth Amendment 
protection did not apply to the FBI surveillance requests.
145
  In addition, FISC noted that without 
the presence of an individualized Fourth Amendment interest, “grouping together a large number 
of similarly-situated individuals cannot result in a Fourth Amendment interest springing into 
existence ex nihilo.
146
 
FISC then analyzed the FBI’s surveillance application under Section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act.
147
  The court found that the statutory provisions “are designed to ensure not only 
that the government has access to the information it needs for authorized investigations, but also 
that there are protections and prohibitions in place to safeguard U.S. person information.”148  
                                                 
142
 In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible 
Things, etc., No. 13-109 at 3 (FISA Ct. 2013). 
143
 Id. at 8. 
144
 Id. 
145
 Id. at 9. 
146
 Id. 
147
 Id. 
148
 Id. at 9-10. (underscoring the protections under the statute, including First Amendment protection, the executive 
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Additionally, FISC compared Section 215 with Section 2703(d) of the SCA and noted Congress’ 
intent to enact two statutes dealing with the same subject, but having distinct purposes; while 
Section 215’s purpose is foreign intelligence information, Section 2703(d)’s purpose is criminal 
investigation.
149
 
The court also reviewed the government’s burden under Section 215, which requires “a 
statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things 
sought are relevant…”150  FISC found that because “international terrorist operatives are using 
telephone communications and … it is necessary to obtain the bulk collection of a telephone 
company’s metadata to determine those connections between known and unknown international 
terrorist operatives as part of authorized investigations”, the government has met the statutory 
burden under Section 215 to obtain records.
151
  FISC’s opinion thus establishes both 
constitutional and statutory legitimacy of the government agency programs collecting telephone 
metadata. 
D. PRISM 
In June 2013, the Washington Post reported the existence of a data-mining program by 
the FBI and NSA, code-named PRISM.
152
  Unlike the telephony metadata collection program, 
PRISM is alleged to be obtaining content-based communications.
153
  Based on classified 
information leaked by former CIA employee and NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the 
Washington Post revealed that the two agencies have been “tapping directly into the central 
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servers of nine leading U.S. Internet companies, extracting audio and video chats, photographs, 
e-mails, documents, and connection logs that enable analysts to track foreign targets.”154   
Although the companies have denied allegations of granting the government direct, 
unfettered access to their servers, they have acknowledged their compliance in responding to 
individual court orders under FISA and establishing an efficient data sharing system with the 
government.
155
  Slide FAA 702 of the leaked PRISM program documents indicates that there are 
two types of collection programs: upstream and downstream, such as PRISM.
156
  While the 
former suggests that there are parasitic surveillance programs collecting communications “as 
data flows past,” the latter shows that “the NSA is receiving data sent to them deliberately by the 
tech companies, as opposed to intercepting communications as they're transmitted to some other 
destination.”157  Thus, PRISM and other downstream programs allow the NSA to obtain data 
from the major tech companies in a mechanical and formalized way rather than directly tapping 
into the servers and collecting information.
158
 
The NSA’s surveillance program is governed by Section 702 of the FAA, which allows 
the AG and DNI to authorize “targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States.”159  Surveillance of U.S. persons therefore cannot be intentionally conducted 
under 702(b)’s limitations.160  However, the Washington Post reported that under the program, 
analysts input search terms “that are designed to produce at least 51 percent confidence in a 
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target’s ‘foreignness.’”161  Concluding that it is “not a very stringent test,” the newspaper further 
reported that incidental collection of American content is difficult to avoid since targeting a 
foreign suspect requires communications from all persons in the suspect’s inbox or outbox to be 
collected.
162
  Known as contact chaining, “intelligence analysts are typically taught to chain 
through contacts two ‘hops’ out from their target, which increases ‘incidental collection’ 
exponentially.”163  In essence, although American content cannot be intentionally targeted by the 
NSA, there is a possibility that such information can be collected. 
Despite the incidental collection of U.S. content, the NSA’s activities appear to be legally 
valid under Section 702.  As an initial matter, it is important to note that the probable cause 
standard for national security investigations is less stringent than that for criminal investigations.  
Not only did the USA PATRIOT Act further relax the language so that foreign intelligence be 
only a “significant purpose” rather than the primary purpose for FISC surveillance orders, but the 
orders themselves are not considered warrants.  Moreover, Section 702 requires that the 
certification, targeting, and minimization procedures be met and the surveillance be conducted in 
a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment before FISC will grant an order approving the 
surveillance.  In addition, the requirement that deficiencies in any of the procedures be corrected 
within a certain time demonstrates the role that FISC plays as judiciary in overseeing the 
activities authorized by Section 702.  For instance, Section 702(i)(3)(B) states that: 
If the Court finds that a certification submitted in accordance with subsection (g) 
does not contain all the required elements, or that the procedures adopted in 
accordance with subsections (d) and (e) are not consistent with the requirements 
of those subsections or the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United 
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States, the Court shall issue an order directing the Government to, at the 
Government’s election and to the extent required by the Court’s order—  
(i) correct any deficiency identified by the Court’s order not later than 30 
days after the date on which the Court issues the order; or 
(ii) cease, or not begin, the implementation of the authorization for which 
such certification was submitted.
164
 
 
Two FISC opinions issued in October and November 2011 demonstrate the significant 
role played by the judiciary in overseeing the NSA’s surveillance activities under Section 702.165  
The FISC opinion from October 3, 2011 examined one of the NSA’s upstream surveillance 
programs collecting Internet communications.
166
  The opinion shows that FISC was not 
completely aware of what and how much information the NSA had been acquiring as part of its 
Internet communications collection.
167
  FISC stated: 
Based on the government’s prior representations, the Court has previously 
analyzed NSA’s targeting and minimization procedures only in the context of 
NSA acquiring discrete communications.  Now, however, in light of the 
government’s revelations as to the manner in which NSA acquires Internet 
communications, it is clear that NSA acquires “Internet transactions,”168 including 
transactions that contain a single discrete communication (“Single 
Communication Transactions” or “SCTs”), and transactions that contain multiple 
discrete communications (“Multi-[C]ommunication Transactions” or “MCTs”)… 
[F]or the first time, the government has now advised the Court that the volume 
and nature of the information it has been collecting is fundamentally different 
from what the Court has been led to believe. 
169
 
 
In response to the revelation, FISC underscored the importance of needing to examine the 
“government’s targeting and minimization procedures … in light of the communications actually 
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acquired.”170  Specifically, FISC reviewed whether the NSA’s collection of Internet transactions 
complied with the targeting and minimization procedures required by the statute and the Fourth 
Amendment.
171
  Although FISC determined that the targeting procedures were in compliance, 
the court found that the minimization procedures failed to meet the standard established by 
statute.
172
  FISC also found that both targeting and minimization procedures did not satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment.
173
 
FISC separated the minimization procedures analysis into acquisition, retention, and 
dissemination of collected information.
174
  Regarding acquisition, FISC determined that despite 
the NSA’s acquisition of “non-target communications, which are highly unlikely to have foreign 
intelligence value,” the agency lacked the technical capability to “limit its collection only to the 
relevant portion or portions of each MCT – i.e., the particular discrete communications that are 
to, from, or about a targeted selector.”175  FISC thus found that this portion of the NSA’s 
minimization procedures complied with the statute’s requirements.176 
FISC next focused on retention and the NSA’s proposed procedures after its acquisition 
of MCTs.
177
  FISC expressed concerns that “the measures proposed by the government for 
MCTs … largely dispense with the requirement of prompt disposition upon initial review by an 
analyst [and] NSA’s proposed handling of MCTs tends to maximize the retention of such 
information, including information of or concerning United States persons with no direct 
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connection to any target.”178  Specifically, FISC highlighted three areas for improvement: 1.) 
limiting the access to domestic MCTs to a smaller group of NSA personnel who are specially 
trained in handling such information; 2.) requiring personnel to indicate that the MCT contains 
domestic information; and 3.) reducing the retention period from five years.
179
 
Initially noting that “FISA imposes a stricter standard for dissemination than for 
acquisition or retention”, FISC reviewed the government’s dissemination measures ranging from 
destruction of domestic MCTs to the limitation preventing dissemination by the NSA of 
domestic MCTs.
180
  The court found that despite the possibility of information concerning 
United States persons being inadvertently collected, the proposed dissemination procedures 
satisfied the requirements of the statute.
181
 
Regarding the Fourth Amendment, FISC acknowledged that acquisition of electronic 
communications can constitute a “search” or “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.
182
  In examining whether the NSA’s targeting and minimization procedures were in 
violation of the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment, the court determined that the NSA’s 
upstream intelligence activities under Section 702 “fall within the ‘foreign intelligence 
exception’ to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”183 
FISC then underwent a reasonableness analysis that involved considering the “nature of 
the government intrusion and how the government intrusion is implemented.”184  The court noted 
that it was required to balance the interests at stake and consider the “totality of the 
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circumstances” as part of its balancing test.185  FISC found that although the “government’s 
national security interest in conducting acquisitions pursuant to Section 702 is of the highest 
order of magnitude … the NSA’s acquisition of MCTs substantially broadens the circumstances 
in which Fourth Amendment-protected interests are intruded upon by NSA’s Section 702 
collection.
186
 
The court then underscored the significance of the minimization procedures in its Fourth 
Amendment analysis.
187
  FISC found that due to the deficiencies in the procedures that “seem to 
enhance, rather than reduce, the risk of error, overretention, and dissemination of non-target 
information, including information protected by the Fourth Amendment,” the NSA’s targeting 
and minimization procedures pertaining to the upstream collection violated the Fourth 
Amendment.
188
 
In response to FISC’s October 3, 2011 opinion finding constitutional and statutory 
deficiencies in the NSA’s upstream surveillance program, the government made adjustments that 
specifically addressed those issues and submitted another application for court approval.
189
  The 
court issued an opinion on November 30, 2011 and found that the “government has adequately 
corrected the deficiencies identified in the October 3 Opinion, and the request for approval is 
therefore granted.”190  Thus, taken together, the FISC opinions demonstrate how the judicial 
oversight process by FISC is sufficient in monitoring the federal agencies’ surveillance activities 
and fixing any problems that exist. 
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V. Conclusion 
This article examined the constitutional framework of cases determining what kind of 
surveillance constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  It also reviewed 
the statutory framework not only governing the surveillance activities being conducted today, but 
also distinguishing surveillance conducted for criminal and national security purposes.  In 
conclusion, unless the Supreme Court undergoes a Fourth Amendment analysis to determine the 
constitutionality of the current FBI and NSA programs, the government’s surveillance activities 
are legally valid under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of the FAA.  In 
other words, as long as the issue of whether the surveillance activities constitute a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and thus require a warrant remains open, a statutory 
analysis will have to suffice to determine the FBI and NSA programs’ legal legitimacy. 
The above statutory analysis demonstrates that the agencies’ collection of metadata 
complies with Section 215 since metadata can qualify as “any tangible things” under a broad 
interpretation.  In addition, so long as NSA programs like PRISM comply with the certification, 
targeting, and minimization procedures, inadvertent collection of U.S. content is lawful under 
Section 702.  NSA’s adherence to the procedures is evident in the FISC opinions from October 
and November 2011. 
Lastly, the materials on the DNI website demonstrate a proper response by the 
government in addressing the unauthorized leaks and disclosures from this year.  They also 
provide sufficient declassified information that when taken as a whole, establishes the legal 
validity of the current surveillance programs.  Thus, although critics argue that these programs 
are in constitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government’s surveillance activities 
will likely continue until the Supreme Court hears the matter and decides otherwise.  The trend 
towards finding privacy expectations despite advancements in technology indicated in Part II’s 
constitutional framework may shed some light on how the Supreme Court will rule. 
